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Division of attitudes towards immigration policy is more polarized than ever (Public 
Religion Research Institute, 2018). Historically, restrictive attitudes towards immigration 
policies have been highest in times of rising nationalist ideals and economic vulnerability (Jaret, 
1999; Ngai, 2004). Primarily a federal responsibility, immigration enforcement was 
decentralized and that power shared with individual states (Pantoja, 2006), leading to policy 
disparities among states (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019; Gulasekaram et al., 2015; Johnson, 2019). 
Studies focusing on the relationship between state economic context and immigration policies, 
found that states that are more economically vulnerable had higher numbers of restrictive 
immigration policies (Ybarra et al., 2016). While some point to economic factors, others have 
found that political ideology and political party alignment are more influential (Brooks et al., 
2016; Natter et al., 2020). 
This study explored the relationship between economic context and attitudes towards 
immigration policies. I found a significant difference in attitudes towards immigration policies 
by political party identification. Democrat had the lowest median score (12.583) meaning they 
held more welcoming attitudes, Independent had the next lowest (16.2732), and Republican had 
the highest score (21.3464) However, I found no significant relationship (-0.032; p=0.05) 
between state-level economic context and individual attitudes towards immigration policies or 
state-level economic context and state average attitudes towards immigration policies (-0.003; 
p=0.05), or individual income levels (p=0.963) and employment levels (p=0.095).  
The evidence of a significant relationship between attitudes towards immigration policy 
political party affiliation has implications for policy, namely the need for bipartisan support and 
highlighting ways that immigration reform benefits all parties. For social work practice 
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implications of this study point toward need for education and transparency about benefits of 
immigration to clients and combatting misinformation that exists surrounding the subject. 
Exploring how political party affiliation and economic factors interact to shape attitudes towards 
immigration policies, and how this in turn affect the development of policy legislation will help 
to understand the overall relationship. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The American middle class, once comprising a clear majority of the population, is 
shrinking along with it’s share of the nation’s aggregate income (Horowitz, Igielnik, & Kochhar, 
2018). While the individual income rate of the upper-class is steadily growing with 64% increase 
of total income since 1970, that of the middle class has only increased 49% and that of the lower 
income only experiencing a 43% gain (Horowitz et al., 2018). This data reflects an era of ever 
widening economic divide that helps the upper-class cement their financial status, while the 
middle and lower-income tiers struggle to adapt to inflation and basic living expenses. Though 
the economic stagnation of 2018 was experienced differently along economic statuses, the entire 
nation has been in a period of slow growth in comparison to the years before the Great Recession 
and slowed from 1.2% to 0.3%, resulting in a median loss of $12,400 for the average American 
household income (Horowitz et al., 2018). As economic inequality has widened and the economy 
stagnated, the ideological divide has deepened, one area in particular is with immigration and 
attitudes towards immigration policies (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). According to a 
recent study though, attitudes about immigration are near equally divided between those that 
support welcoming policies and those that support restrictive policies, more individuals fall at the 
extreme ends of the spectrum, and there are far fewer moderates than ever (Public Religion 
Research Institute, 2018). 
This divide is reflected in Congress, which has been deadlocked in regard to immigration 
reform for years (Ybarra, 2016). These realities are reflected in the policies that are currently 
being debated include building a wall along the U.S. Mexican border, the amount of asylee and 
refugee visas being given, detainment and family separation, as well as local law enforcement 
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. This has real consequences for the immigrant 
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population already living in the country, as well as those seeking residency status. Immigrant 
detainment has now led to 214 deaths since 2003 due to severe medical neglect, as well as 
children who have been separated from their families to never be reunited again (Detention 
Watch Network, 2019).  
Beyond detention, there are those that are left in limbo at the borders, sometimes having 
traveled hundreds of miles away from their home countries to flee dangerous circumstances, only 
to find themselves in other dangerous situations on their journey and while waiting at the border 
(American Immigration Council, 2019). Policies including “metering,” or limiting the number of 
individuals who are permitted to access the asylum process each day at ports of entry on the 
Mexican border, and Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which require asylum seekers to 
remain in Mexico while they await their court date, leave asylum seekers vulnerable to 
trafficking, unsafe living conditions, and even death (American Immigration Council, 2019). 
Individual attitudes inform our decisions on who we choose to represent us in state and 
federal government as we elect those that reflect our views. Through influencing voters’ attitudes 
concerning immigration, we can influence who is in Congress creating those policies that affect 
the lives of immigrants in the U.S. and those seeking immigration status. Perhaps economic 
factors are at the heart of this change. 
As states have become more involved in regulating immigration, understanding how state 
level economic context affects individual attitudes can help us to better understand their 
relationship. Research on attitudes towards immigration and economics primarily focused on 
national attitudes (Jaret, 1999; Pantoja, 2006) or on how the economy impacts immigration 
legislation (Ybarra, 2016). Where it is lacking is on the state economic front. This gap could be 
filled through exploring the growing divide in immigration attitudes may prove to be key in 
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understanding the overall relationship. Furthermore, exploring other factors in economic context 
and influences on attitude formation like individual income, employment status and political 
ideology. Do states with a lower level of state economic wellbeing have a statistically significant 
relationship with restrictive attitudes towards immigration policies and vice versa? Do individual 
economic factors like income and employment status have an influence on what immigration 
policies one supports? What is the relationship between sanctuary policy support and individual 
income and employment? Or is political ideology at the core of immigration attitude formation?  
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the history of immigration policy as well as the current era of 
decentralization of immigration enforcement. I then describe the existing research on the 
relationship between state and individual economic factors and on attitudes towards immigration 
policies. Chapter 3 details my process in choosing methods and defining the variables of my 
study. In Chapter 4, I display my results using correlation and ANOVA analyses. I explore the 
questions of which factors have the most impact on immigration attitudes on a regional, state and 
individual level. Chapter 5 explores and discusses these results as well as how they fit into the 
previous literature, followed by Chapter 6 in which I will discuss conclusions made from this 
research and implications for social work practice, police and research. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Attitudes towards immigration policies have evolved throughout U.S. history, fluctuating 
between periods of restrictive and welcoming attitudes (Jaret, 1999; Pantoja, 2006; Ybarra et al., 
2016). These changes in attitudes have direct impacts on policy implementations (Nafziger, 
2009; Pantoja, 2006). As immigration enforcement has become increasingly decentralized, there 
is now more variation in policy by state (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019). I first discuss trends in 
immigration attitudes throughout U.S. history and the modern era of immigration enforcement 
decentralization as well as the specific policy disparities among states. I then describe the effects 
of the economy on a state, regional and individual level including income and employment on 
those policies. Finally, I identify gaps in the research surrounding state-level economic 
implications. 
History of Immigration Policy and Attitudes 
Restrictive immigration attitudes have been found to be highest during times of economic 
downturn and when the country is experiencing greater numbers of immigrants from countries 
outside of Western Europe (Jaret, 1999). From his research he found that this is due to the drive 
of individuals to protect their own financial wellbeing and worry over loss of national identity or 
heterogenization (Jaret, 1999). Early in the history of our country and throughout much of the 
18th and 19th centuries, immigration was relatively free and open reflecting a laissez-faire attitude 
towards mobility that dated back to the colonial period (Ngai, 2004). The migration of the first 
European settlers from England to the United States is an example of that previous freedom of 
movement that was allowed before immigration restriction began (Ngai, 2004). In the 19th 
century immigration in the United States was encouraged and unfettered, driven by the capitalist 
need for more workers from around the world to support the labor needs of the industrial 
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revolution (Ngai, 2004). Immigration attitudes at this time were welcoming due to the positive 
impact it had on the economy and the cheap labor the immigrants brought (Ngai, 2004). Even 
before the enactment of the first immigration law, economic factors still surrounded and 
influenced immigration attitudes.  
In the earliest policies regarding immigration restriction, we can see the impact of both 
nationalist ideals and economic factors. Because immigrant labor helped to sustain the economic 
boon and development of the United States, attitudes at this time were overwhelmingly positive 
and immigration was encouraged to sustain the growth of a new nation (Ngai, 2004).  
In the mid 1800’s, Chinese workers began migrating to the United States primarily to 
work in the gold mines, but also to work in agriculture, factories and on the railroad (Ngai, 
2004). Anti-Chinese immigrant sentiments began to grow at this time as Chinese laborers 
worked for lower wages than American workers, often beating out American workers for labor 
(Ngai, 2004). This combined with the stark ethnic contrast in comparison to dominantly Anglo-
Saxon immigrants of the past, clashed with the dominant American view of national identity and 
had an impact on the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the first U.S. immigration 
policy to place regulations of immigrants from an entire country (Ngai, 2004).  
World War I spurred a global trend of tightening and better defining national borders and 
the creation of passports and visas, ending the laissez-faire mentality surrounding migration 
(Ngai, 2004). In line with this trend, the U.S. passed the Johnson Reed Immigration Act of 1924, 
which established the passport and visa requirement, as well as the quota system that placed 
numerical limits on immigration based on nationality and race (Ngai, 2004). The restrictions of 
this immigration policy were influenced by both the rise in nationalism after the Great War and a 
decrease in need for manual labor in manufacturing industries as more implemented 
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technological advances and mass production (Ngai, 2004). This new job scarcity was paired with 
warnings of large quantities of impoverished immigrants fleeing countries devastated by the war 
to the United States which fanned anti-immigrant sentiments (Ngai, 2004).  
Not only was the creation of the quota system effected by these factors, but also the 
implementation as the number of immigrants allowed entry from each country was connected to 
the economic and political relationship with their country of nationality (Ngai, 2004). The turn of 
the 20th century was highlighted as a period of both economic struggle due to unfair working 
conditions and compensation before many modern labor and health regulation and general 
xenophobia, as immigrants from Eastern Europe were increasing in immigration numbers in 
comparison to Western Europe (Jaret, 1999). While the earlier half of the century saw a majority 
of immigrants coming from European countries, the 1960’s began an increase of immigration 
from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, who were viewed as more “other” than Western 
European immigrants (Jaret, 1999). During this time anti-immigration sentiment rose again due 
to attitudes created by fear of losing a national identity and heterogenization (Jaret, 1999). These 
attitudes have the ability to create a lasting impact on policy and the realities faced by 
immigrants in the U.S. (Reyna, Dobria & Wetherell, 2013). 
Decentralization of Immigration Policy 
Two policies enacted in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), had lasting impact on immigration (Pantoja, 2006). U.S. immigration enforcement 
was historically handled at a national level until IIRIRA was enacted, which allowed states to 
share in burden of the enforcement of immigration law through decentralization (Pantoja, 2006). 
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IIRIRA devolved immigration enforcement to the individual states, creating disparities in 
enforcement and access to social services (Pantoja, 2006).  
Attitudes towards immigrants in the 1990’s centered on fear of creating a dependent state 
and immigrants being public charges of the welfare system (Pantoja, 2006). The enactment of 
PRWORA in 1996 stripped the security net from under immigrants, through a policy that 
prohibits them from accessing federal support during their first five years in the United States 
(Pantoja, 2006). The exclusionary attitudes towards immigration of the 1990s changed to 
xenophobia and distrust in the 2000s after the events of September 11, 2001 (Nafziger, 2009). 
The policies again reflected attitudes and misplaced fear that Americans were feeling with the 
passing of the Homeland Security Act in 2002 and the subsequent creation of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, or ICE (Nafziger, 2009). The formation of ICE has turned the issue of 
immigration enforcement into a criminal issue instead of the civil issue that it is (Douglas & 
Sáenz, 2013). This combined with private prisons contracting out beds to ICE, immigrants, 
asylees, and refugees can find themselves in prison facilities. (Douglas & Sáenz, 2013).  
Now, more than a decade after the events of September 11, 2001, Public Religion 
Research Institute asserts that attitudes are trending more positively towards immigrants of all 
backgrounds, yet immigrants find themselves in an ever-hostile environment (2018). The most 
people in the history of the PRRI survey support reducing immigration levels and a majority 
agree that immigrants strengthen the country, are hard-working, don’t want to be supported by 
welfare and have strong family values (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). This is at odds 
with the current policies immigrants are facing. Detention numbers in 2019 reached an average 
daily population of 50,165 and an annual total of 510,854 (Detention Watch Network, 2019). 
This is a staggering statistic given reports of inhumane conditions within the detention centers, 
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accusations of forced sterilizations (Hamilton, 2011) and family separations (Aranda & Vaquera, 
2018) on an ever-growing number of detainee deaths (Detention Watch Network, 2019). 
Though immigration attitudes are trending positively, they are more divided than ever 
with the minority not only somewhat supporting, but strongly supporting these punitive policies 
(Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). This divisiveness can create a gridlock in Congress 
concerning immigration reform and has led to disparities in state immigration policies (Butz & 
Kehrberg, 2019). While federal legislation still governs overarching immigration policy, states 
have the ability to pass laws that support a more welcoming or restrictive environment for 
immigrants through state-level policies concerning employment restrictions, law enforcement 
policies, education opportunity, access to public services and welfare, and even those as simple 
as obtaining a driver’s license (Gulasekaram et al., 2015). Particularly the discussion of law 
enforcement policies and cooperation with ICE interventions has been in the forefront of current 
debates, much due to the disparities between states with or without sanctuary policies (Johnson, 
2019). The state of California was the first to adopt a sanctuary policy, a law that prohibits law 
enforcement officials from inquiring about an individual’s immigration status or holding them 
without a criminal warrant (Johnson, 2019). Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
Oregon, and Vermont have adopted similar policies (Johnson, 2019). Sanctuary policies do help 
to mitigate the negative impact of federal immigration enforcement, but in other states the 
policies can be vastly different. 
In contrast to the sanctuary policies of other states, states like Arizona penned new 
legislation in 2010 requiring law enforcement to explicitly question every person arrested about 
their immigration status (National Immigration Law Center, 2011). Five other states, Utah, 
Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina followed suit and passed similar laws. Other 
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states including Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina and Tennessee have enacted 
policies to discourage sanctuary cities by blocking funding (Gulasekaram et al., 2019). Texas, a 
state with one of the highest populations of immigrants in the country, signed SB 4 to discourage 
Austin from continuing with its sanctuary policies by blocking state funding to the city. 
(Gulasekaram et al., 2019).  
Beyond sanctuary policy, there are other welcoming policies that states are enacting. Ten 
states and the District of Columbia allow unauthorized immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses, a 
major barrier to everyday life in the US (National Immigration Law Center, 2020). Twenty-four 
states supported President Obama’s executive actions to grant work permits to nearly four 
million unauthorized immigrants already living in the country and to protect them from 
deportation (National Immigration Law Center, 2020).  
The other twenty-six states not only opposed the executive action, but filed a lawsuit 
challenging it (National Immigration Law Center, 2020), favoring more restrictive immigration 
policies. Florida, which is home to more immigrants than any other state, was one of those 
twenty-six. The expansion of a program called Secure Communities (SCOMM) sparked the 
extreme criminalization of immigration enforcement that we recognize today (Nowrasteh, 2017). 
The expansion of this policy made it mandatory for local law enforcement to cooperate with 
federal immigration enforcement (Sktrentny & Lopez, 2013). One purpose cited for this was to 
remove “dangerous criminals” and “undeserving immigrants” (Sktrentny & Lopez, 2013). 
Again, attitudes revolving around fear of danger and financial strain are at the core of the 
decisions. In 2008, the country maintained less than 100 beds in prisons for immigration 
detention, but by the end of 2014 that number had risen to more than 3,000 (Collingwood, Morin 
& El-Khatib, 2018). Many of the ICE detention contracts went to private prison corporations like 
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CCA and The GEO Group, both of which earned over 3 billion dollars in 2016 (Collingwood et 
al., 2018). Federal cooperation with the private prison industry, which has a high stake in 
keeping their beds occupied and strong lobbying power, doesn’t lead to accommodating policies 
being embraced. In 2015 Obama replaced SCOMM with the Priority Enforcement Program that 
was more targeted at serious offenders and did not mandate local law enforcement to cooperate 
in immigration enforcement (Nowrasteh, 2017). This change in policy reflected the attitudes 
towards immigrants steadily becoming more positive during the latter part of the 2010’s (Public 
Religion Research Institute, 2018).  
Economic Context and Attitudes toward Immigration 
Given the patterns observed in the close fluctuations of the trends in both economies and 
changes in immigration policy, it’s essential to understand how those patterns differ in varying 
economic contexts. One study analyzed the effects of the economy on democratic societies and 
found that when the economy is perceived as “bad” voters are less likely to support expansionist 
policies like welfare funding or immigration reform, in other words, when voters are more 
concerned about their well-being, their attitudes towards issues concerning immigration become 
more conservative, even over political ideology (Kim & Fording, 2001). While Kim and Fording 
(2001) examined the effects of the economy on 13 Western democracies as a whole, the overall 
picture of the economic landscape is missing for countries, like the U.S., in which state economy 
varies greatly to the national economy. 
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 showed us that while we may experience a nation-
wide economic downturn, the effects at the state-level can vary, with some experiencing worse 
decline than the nation’s average, and others experiencing a boom (Ybarra et al., 2016). The 
same was observed in 2018 and continuing into the current time as once booming manufacturing 
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and agricultural businesses have been steadily declining, while tech and service industries are 
increasing (Whiton & Muro, 2019). States in the upper Midwest like Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin which rely heavily on manufacturing revenue have therefore suffered greater 
economically than states with thriving tech industries like Massachusetts, California, Delaware, 
and the District of Columbia (Atkinson & Nager, 2014).  
In the 2016 elections, many voters voted outside of their party and the economy was a 
major swaying factor in states where the economy was weaker (Kolko, 2016). In fact, the 
manufacturing industry, which was once starkly blue, has reversed to majority red-leaning 
(Whiton & Muro, 2019). By 2013, it was found that support for accommodating immigration 
policies declines as confidence in the economy deteriorates. Rhetoric was used which reflected 
sentiments from the 1990’s surrounding immigrants being harmful for the economy and “taking” 
jobs from the American worker (Esposito & Finley, 2019).  
In another study, Wilson found that when Americans feel that their employment status is 
in jeopardy that they will hold more restrictive immigration views in order to protect their own 
self-interests, even though immigrants have been proven to be a net benefit to the economy 
(2001). He further went on to find that these attitudes have significant influence on their policy 
preferences and implications for which candidates they prefer (Wilson, 2001). While Wilson 
studied the attitudes towards immigrants as a whole, a different study from 2017 expanded upon 
these findings to say that economic self-interest has a disproportionately greater effect when it 
comes to attitudes towards low-skilled immigration (Gerber et al., 2017). These studies show that 




State Economic Context and Immigration Policy 
Moving from a national economic context to a state-level context becomes more 
important as immigration enforcement has become more decentralized. Because of this 
decentralization and subsequent responsibility, states are now enacting their own legislation on 
immigration enforcement and therefore studying the effect of state economic context on those 
decisions has become increasingly important. There have been a few previous studies that have 
highlighted the importance of the state economy to immigration attitudes (Dancygier & 
Donnelly, 2013; Ybarra et al., 2016). Ybarra explored how state economies during the Great 
Recession of 2007 affected immigration legislation and found that a record number of states 
enacted restrictive immigration policies between 2005 and 2012 (2016). The study found that 
this period was marked by fear of financial collapse (Ybarra et al., 2016). This fear negatively 
influenced attitudes towards immigrants at the time who were again characterized as becoming 
dependent off of social support and state welfare (Ybarra et al., 2016). This harkens back to 
similar sentiments held during the 1990s, another period marked by overwhelmingly restrictive 
immigration policies. Ybarra took the previous research of economic wellbeing on immigration 
policy and studied it by state and finding that states experienced the Great Recession differently, 
with some even experiencing boons, and that immigration policy enactment could be better 
understood on a state level (Ybarra et al., 2016). They found that the economic strain felt by the 
Great Recession had a different impact depending on the state, and that those with higher levels 
of strain, had higher numbers of restrictive policies enacted, even while controlling for political 
ideology (Ybarra et al., 2016).  
Other studies further corroborate these findings showing that attitudes are more tied to a 
state’s industry’s success versus the overall success of the nation’s economy (Dancygier & 
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Donnelly, 2013). Dancygier and Donnelly found that individuals employed in sector’s that were 
growing were more likely to support accommodating immigration policies in comparison to 
those whose employment was at risk in sectors that were shrinking (2013). Because states have 
differing industries, this could have an effect on the immigration policy disparity that we are 
seeing amongst states. 
Political Ideology and Immigration Attitudes  
 Political ideology, a set of certain ethical ideals, principles and doctrines of a set group 
that provides a blueprint for how society should function, is influential in the formation of 
attitudes towards immigration policies (Brooks, Manza & Cohen, 2016). In respect to 
immigration, attitudes range from restrictive to welcoming in regard to political ideology. 
Research shows that self-identified Conservatives are more likely to show greater distrust and 
hostility towards “out-groups,” or those not part of the majority culture, than their self-identified 
Liberal counterparts, who are typically more tolerant of ambiguity and differences in culture, 
lifestyle and identity (Brooks, Manza & Cohen, 2016). Expanding on this, the study also found 
that Conservatives were more likely to hold negative attitudes regarding immigrants who don’t 
closely resemble the dominant group and which they perceive to pose economic threats (Brooks 
et al., 2016).    
 In another study which surveyed 21 Western democracies between 1970 and 2012 found 
that political ideology had an even greater effect on attitude formation when in regard to asylum 
seekers and undocumented immigrants (Natter, Czaika, & Haas, 2020). Asylum seekers and 
undocumented immigrants are some of the most vulnerable immigrant populations as they are at 
risk of being deported in the case of undocumented immigrants and trafficked or left in 
dangerous situations in the case of asylum seekers (Natter et al., 2020). They also happen to be 
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the most vilified in the political rhetoric (Natter et al., 2020). When comparing attitude 
formations within the Conservative ideology, it has been found that rural conservatives hold 
more restrictive views than even their suburban or urban counterparts (Fennelly & Federico, 
2008). The study does not explore the reasoning for this be it less interaction with immigrant 
populations or failing economies in rural areas.  
Conceptual Model 
 The conceptual model below displays the breakdown of impact from national economic 
context to individual attitudes towards immigration policies. National economic context has an 
impact on state-level economic context, political ideology formation, individual income and 
employment status. These factors in turn have a reciprocating impact back onto national 
economic context. State-level economic context has an impact on political ideology, individual 
income and employment status and national economic context, which all have a reciprocating 
impact back on state-level economic context. Individual income and employment status both 
have an impact on formation of individual attitudes towards immigration policies, national 
economic context and state-level economic context, which all have a reciprocating impact back 
on individual income and employment status. Political ideology has an impact on individual 
attitudes towards immigration policies, state-level economic context and national economic 
context, which all three have reciprocating impact on political ideology. Individual attitudes 









Summary of Relevant Literature 
Studies on the economic effects on immigration attitudes have found that in times of 
economic struggle, restrictive immigration attitudes peak (Jaret, 1999), and that economic 
fluctuations have an impact not only on individual attitudes toward immigration, but also a 
lasting effect on policy implementation (Kim & Fording, 2001; Ybarra et al., 2016). Due to the 
decentralization of immigration enforcement, a disparity in immigration policy implementation 
is being experienced (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019; Sáenz, 2013). Research examining the 
relationship between attitudes towards immigration and economic wellbeing have tend to focus 
on the national economy’s relationship to individual attitudes, or state economies’ relationship to 
policy enactment. Yet states are a key player in immigration integration, as shown in their 
implementations of both restrictive and accommodating immigration policies. Looking at the 
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effect of economic context on immigration attitudes, this study aims to fill the gaps by looking at 
the relationship between state-level economic context and individual attitudes towards 
immigration policies. Yet further questions remain unanswered and so my research tests if 
economic vulnerability due to income and employment status correlates with restrictive attitudes 
towards immigration policies. The study further analyzes the effect of political ideology on 





CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
To answer these questions, I examined the relationship between state-level economic context and 
immigration attitudes using data from the 2018 American Values Survey (AVS) conducted by 
the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) and the State Economic Coefficient Index (SECI), 
produced by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve. How does state-level economic wellbeing affect 
relate to individual attitudes towards immigration policies? Specifically, does living in a state 
with lower levels of state economic wellbeing predict support for restrictive immigration 
policies? Or the reverse, do higher levels of state-level economic wellbeing predict support for 
welcoming policies like sanctuary? Do individual factors like income and employment status 
impact the relationship? How does political ideology affect this relationship? 
Data  
I used data from the American Values Survey (AVS) to quantify attitudes toward 
immigration policy and from the FED Reserve Board to measure state-level economic wellbeing. 
The AVS is conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a nonprofit and 
nonpartisan research organization dedicated to exploring the changing political, cultural, and 
social landscape of the United States (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). PRRI surveys a 
representative panel of the U.S. population using random sampling through mail solicitation and 
phone surveys. Each respondent is then assigned a weight in order to ensure the sample closely 
matches U.S. demographic makeup factors of gender, age, education, race and Hispanic 
ethnicity, and division (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018), housing type, and telephone 
usage to match U.S. Census parameters (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). All surveys 
are provided in both Spanish and English (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). The AVS is 
collected yearly and raw data files become public access after one year for researchers to use as 
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secondary data and to inform the public on changing attitudes and opinions (Public Religion 
Research Institute, 2018. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 2.8 percentage points at the 
95% level of confidence. The 2018 survey has a sample size of 2,509 and representation from 
each state, allowing for state level disaggregation. 
I used the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s State Economic Coefficient Index (SECI) to 
examine state level economic wellbeing. The SECI combines the four state level factors of 
nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, 
the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements plus proprietors’ income deflated by 
the consumer price index to define state economic wellbeing (Ybarra et al., 2016). The SECI 
reports monthly, making it a great choice to focus in on the specific time period of the 2018 
AVS, and helping to eliminate threats to validity. Data for nonfarm payroll employment, the 
unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing, and the consumer price index was 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and wages and salary disbursement data by state 
was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve in 
order to calculate the SECI (Philadelphia Federal Reserve, 2020). 
Measures 
In order to operationalize the variables of attitudes towards immigration policies, political 
ideology, individual income and employment status, I used data from the 2018 AVS. To 






Individual Attitudes towards Immigration Policies 
I measured attitudes towards immigration policies using six different questions that ask 
respondents to state how much they agree or disagree on a Likert scale with a specific type of 
policy, given in Table 1 below. Types of immigration policies fell into two broad categories 
according to whether they would restrict of welcome immigration. Four questions, those 
regarding building a border wall, imposing stricter immigration limits, prohibiting refugees from 
entering the country, and separating families at the border were coded as restrictive. Responses 
to these restrictive policy questions of strongly favor were coded as 5, favor as 4, don’t know as 
3, oppose as 2 and strongly oppose as 1. Two questions, those regarding granting a pathway to 
citizenship to unauthorized immigration brought to the U.S. as children and limiting local 
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, were coded as welcoming. Responses to 
these welcoming policies were reverse coded with strongly favor coded as 1, favor as 2, oppose 
as 3 don’t know, 4 as oppose and strongly oppose as 5. A composite score was then calculated by 
summing the scores from the six question. Possible score range from 6-30. This numerical value 
represents attitudes towards immigration policies and lower scores show support for more 
welcoming policies and higher scores shows support for more restrictive policies. 







State Average Attitudes Towards Immigration Policies 
 In order to analyze the data on a state-level basis as well, I operationalized state average 
attitudes towards immigration policies using the same score determination as for individual 
attitudes. These scores were then used to find a state-average variable by compiling all scores 
from residents in that state and finding the mean score. This number also falls in a range from 6-
30 with lower scores reflecting more welcoming attitudes and higher scores reflecting more 





State Economic Wellbeing 
I measured state economic wellbeing using the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s State 
Economic Coefficient Index (SECI). The SECI combines state level factors of nonfarm payroll 
employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the unemployment 
rate, and wage and salary disbursements plus proprietors’ income deflated by the consumer price 
index (Ybarra et al., 2016). The SECI reports monthly, making it a great choice to focus in on the 
specific time period of the 2018 AVS, and helping to eliminate threats to validity. The monthly 
SECI score is compared against the previous month’s score to derive a net increase or decrease 
in state wellbeing. (Philadelphia Federal Reserve, 2020). The greater the net change in score, the 
better the state economic wellbeing. A lower, or even negative, score shows lower levels of state 
economic wellbeing. Using the October 2018 SECI data produced scores with a range of -0.14 to 





 To operationalize political ideology, I will use political party affiliation as a proxy for 
political ideology. I used the question from the 2018 AVS that specifically asked if the 
respondent considered themselves a Republican, Democrat or Independent. I only used responses 
that fell into one of these categories and respondents were coded as one of the options based on 
their survey response.  
Individual Income 
 Data from the demographic question section in the 2018 AVS asking respondents to 
identify which category they fall into. The categories range from less than $5,000 a year to over 
$200,000 dollars a year.  
Individual Employment 
 Individual employment status was operationalized using data from the 2018 AVS from 
the question asking respondents to define their employment status. The possible response 
categories were working as a paid employee; working, self-employed; not working, on 
temporary layoff from a job; not working, looking for work; not working, retired; not working, 
disabled; or not working, other. 
Analytical Strategy 
I hypothesized that SECI will have a negative relationship with support for restrictive 
immigration attitudes such as a support for border wall construction, placing stricter limits on 
number of legal immigrants, preventing refugees from entering the country, and family 
separation at the border while states. In other words, individuals living in states experiencing 
23 
 
higher economic vulnerability will hold more restrictive immigration attitudes. Conversely, I 
hypothesized that those living in less economically vulnerable states will hold less restrictive 
attitudes and more supportive of welcoming policies like sanctuary policies and allowing 
undocumented children brought to the country a pathway to legal resident status.  
Similarly, I hypothesized that after combining state score for attitudes, there will be a 
similar relationship between that and SECI. I hypothesize that a negative relationship will exist 
between state attitudes and SECI, meaning that more restrictive attitudes will exist in states that 
are more economically vulnerable. Again, I used Pearson’s r coefficient analysis to study this 
relationship. 
I examined the relationship between state average attitudes towards immigration policies 
and SECI, individual income level and attitudes towards immigration policies, using a test of 
correlation and Pearson’s r coefficient. This allows me to study the relationship between the two 
continuous variables. A correlation test measures the extent to which the variables are related 
and how well one variable can predict another. Using this strategy I can determine if state-level 
economic wellbeing can predict individual immigration attitudes. Pearson’s r will be used as the 
correlation coefficient and will determine the slope of the line that best fits the scatterplot. The 
sign, either negative or positive, denotes the direction of the relationship, and the numerical 
value, between -1 and 1, demonstrates the strength of the relationship. Negative one would be a 
perfect negative relationship and positive one would be a perfect positive relationship.  
When looking at the question from an individual level, I hypothesized that individual 
attitude scores will have a negative relationship with both income levels and employment status. 
This would mean that higher levels of both income and employment status have a correlation 
with lower attitude scores and favoring more accommodating immigration policies. I hypothesize 
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when analyzing the relationship between income levels and attitudes towards the support for 
allowing cities to limit cooperation with the national government’s efforts to enforce 
immigration laws, better known as sanctuary policies, a positive relationship will exist. In other 
words, higher levels of personal income would correlate with support for sanctuary policies. 
Similarly, when looking specifically at the question of support for sanctuary policies, I 
hypothesize that individual income level and employment status will both have a significant 
positive relationship with support for sanctuary policy. This would mean that higher levels of 
income and employment would correlate with higher support for sanctuary policies. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that when analyzing the difference in immigration attitudes 
amongst the political ideologies of Democratic, Republican and Independent, that Republican 
will hold higher scores, Independent more moderate scores, and Democratic will hold the lowest 
scores of all three. This would mean that Republican ideologies hold more restrictive views, 
Independent as more moderate, and Democratic as more accommodating in their immigration 
policy attitudes. 
ANOVA analysis was used to analyze the differences in attitudes between the categorical 
variables of income, employment, and political party affiliation in proxy for political ideology in 
relation to attitude scores and support for sanctuary policies. ANOVA analysis will allow me to 
determine if there is a statistically significant difference in scores amongst the groups and 






CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 I analyzed data from the 2018 AVS to explore the relationship between attitudes towards 
immigration policies, economic context and political party affiliation. Specifically, I examined 
the relationship between a composite attitude score and SECI at the state level, as well as 
individual income and employment. I examine the difference in support for sanctuary policy 
among individual income and employment levels. Additionally, I examine the relationship 
between attitudes and individual political ideologies. 
Participant Demographics 
 Table 1 presents the demographics of respondents (n=2,509). The majority (65.9%) of 
respondents identified as White, non-Hispanic, lower than the U.S. Census Bureau’s population 
estimates from 2019 showing a 76.3% makeup. 10.9% identified as Black, non-Hispanic, again 
slightly lower than the Census estimate of 13.4%. 15.5% of respondents identified as Hispanic, 
slightly lower that the 18.5% Census estimate, and 3% identified as Asian, non-Hispanic, also 
slightly lower than the Census estimate of 5.9% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). The remaining 
4.7% is made up of other, non-specified races and those identifying as two or more races. The 
gender distribution of the sample shows that a slight majority (52.3%) of the respondents 
identified as female, matching what is estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau (2019). The majority 
(30.3%) of the sample were between 30 and 44 years old, with the 60+ age range constituting 
29.1% of respondents. 14.8% were between the ages of 18 and 29 and 25.8% were between the 
ages of 45 and 59. The political breakdown of the data found that those identifying as 
Republican were 22.9%, Democrat as 36.6%, Independent as 35.1% and other as 4.4%. The 
largest portion (10.6%) of respondents fell into the income category of $60,000 to $74,999 
26 
 
category. 2.2% of respondents fell into the lowest income category of less that $5,000 while 
2.9% fell into the highest of over $200,000 per year. 
Table 1. Demographics (n=2,509) 
Characteristic % n 
Demographic:   
Race/Ethnicity 
  
     White, non-Hispanic 65.9 1653 
     Black, non-Hispanic 10.9 273 
     Other, non-Hispanic 1.6 39 
     Hispanic 15.5 388 
     2+, non-Hispanic 3.2 81 
     Asian, non-Hispanic 3 75 
Gender 
  
     Male 47.7 1196 
     Female 52.3 1313 
Age 
  
     18-29 14.8 372 
     30-44 30.3 760 
     45-59 25.8 647 
     60+ 29.1 730 
Political party 
  
     Republican 22.9 575 
     Democrat 36.6 918 
     Independent 35.1 880 
     Other 4.4 110 
Income   
     Less than $5,000 2.2 56 
     $5,000 to $9,999 2.6 66 
     $10,000 to $14,999 4.4 110 
     $15,000 to $19,999 4.5 112 
     $20,000 to $24,999 6.2 155 
     $25,000 to $29,999 5.9 149 
     $30,000 to $34,999 6.3 158 
     $35,000 to $39,999 4.5 113 
     $40,000 to $49,999 8.2 206 
     $50,000 to $59,999 9.1 228 
     $60,000 to $74,999 10.6 266 
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     $75,000 to $84,999 4.9 124 
     $85,000 to $99,999 9.4 235 
     $100,000 to $124,999 8.9 223 
     $125,000 to $149,999 4.9 123 
     $150,000 to $174,999 2.7 67 
     $175,000 to $199,999 1.8 45 
     $200,000 or more 2.9 73 
Employment   
     Working - as a paid employee 52.1 1308 
     Working - self-employed 9.8 245 
     Not working - on temporary layoff from a job 0.6 15 
     Not working - looking for work 5.3 132 
     Not working - retired 18.4 462 
     Not working - disabled 7 176 
     Not working - other 6.8 171 
 
Immigration Attitudes 
 Nearly half (46%) of respondents fell into the welcoming category, followed by moderate 
immigration policy attitudes (36%), and then the lowest percent (18%) falling into the restrictive 
category. Table 2 (n=1,184) describes the breakdown of attitude by which category of 
welcoming, moderate, or restrictive they fall into. Welcoming attitudes includes responses 
between 6 and 14, moderate includes those between 15 and 22, and restrictive includes those 
between 23 and 30.  
Table 2. Attitudes Towards Immigration (n=1,184) 
 
 
Attitude n % 
Welcoming 545 46% 
Moderate 427 36% 
Restrictive 212 18% 
Total 1184 100% 
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On average, attitude scores for the United States was 16.0969, with a standard deviation 
of 6.57455, meaning the average scores deviated from the mean score nearly 6 points. Those 
with lower scores reflected an overall more accommodating immigration attitudes and with 
higher scores reflecting more restrictive attitudes. Scores ranged from the low of 7 to a high of 
25.6667 on the possible scale from 6 to 30. The mean and standard deviation of average 
immigration attitude score by state is represented in Table 3. 
Table 3. State Average Immigration Attitudes 
State Mean N Std. Deviation 
Alabama 17.7368 19 5.33169 
Arkansas 15.5 8 5.04268 
Arizona 16.0938 32 6.70272 
California 15.5952 126 5.8763 
Colorado 15.973 37 7.38424 
Connecticut 17.2 10 5.84618 
District of Columbia 18 1 . 
Delaware 15.2857 7 6.23737 
Florida 16.633 109 6.7846 
Georgia 15.5882 34 6.2237 
Hawaii 16.3333 3 2.08167 
Iowa 17.9474 19 5.44134 
Idaho 16.7222 18 6.51519 
Illinois 16.8667 60 6.7785 
Indiana 14.3 30 6.45488 
Kansas 15.5 12 7.40393 
Kentucky 14.7273 11 5.76352 
Louisiana 14.2353 17 7.72601 
Massachusetts 15.8696 23 7.08587 
Maryland 12.6154 13 4.9923 
Maine 14.1429 7 3.89138 
Michigan 15.3243 37 6.59568 
Minnesota 14.5789 19 6.40586 
Missouri 15.9677 31 6.40044 
Mississippi 19.75 4 4.78714 
Montana 20 5 8.21584 
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North Carolina 13.2927 41 5.88746 
North Dakota 17 1 . 
Nebraska 17.4091 22 6.10744 
New Hampshire 25.6667 3 2.08167 
New Jersey 16.9688 32 6.93046 
New Mexico 15.6667 6 6.91857 
Nevada 15.4444 9 5.31769 
New York 15.5417 48 6.57189 
Ohio 17.4182 55 6.95139 
Oklahoma 19.5 14 7.11175 
Oregon 13.5455 11 7.75066 
Pennsylvania 17 31 6.733 
Rhode Island 21.5 2 7.77817 
South Carolina 15.4286 7 6.55381 
South Dakota 14 8 7.85584 
Tennessee 17.931 29 6.32981 
Texas 16.0506 79 6.36275 
Utah 15.8 10 7.26942 
Virginia 17.3333 18 8.77161 
Vermont 10.5 2 6.36396 
Washington 13.0476 21 5.51794 
Wisconsin 17.1702 47 7.28405 
West Virginia 18.375 8 6.54517 
Wyoming 7 1 . 
Total 16.0969 1197 6.57455 
 
Attitudes Towards Immigration and Economic Context 
 I examined both individual level attitudes towards immigration policies and state average 
attitudes in relation to SECI and found no significant relationship for either. Table 4 (n=1,197) 
displays the correlation between individual attitudes towards immigration policies and SECI of 
the state the resident resides in. A weak (-0.032) inverse relationship was found between the two 
variables, showing that no significant relationship exists between lower SECI and more 





Table 4. Relationship Between Individual Attitudes and SECI (n=1,197) 
Variables Correlation SECI Ind. attitudes 
SECI Pearson Correlation 1 -0.032 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.273 
 N 2509 1197 
Ind. attitudes Pearson Correlation -0.032 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.273  
  N 1197 1197 
 
 As shown in Table 4 (n=50), I found a weak inverse relationship between state average 
attitudes towards immigration attitudes and SECI (-0.003). This shows that there is no significant 
relationship showing that states with lower SECI correlate with higher attitude scores, or more 
restrictive attitudes towards immigration policies. 
Table 4. Relationship Between State Average Immigration Attitudes and SECI (n=50) 
Variables Correlation SECI AvgStateAttitude 
SECI 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.003 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.982 
AvgStateAttitude 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.003 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.982   
 
Individual Immigration Attitudes and Individual Economic Context  
 There was no significant difference in attitudes when comparing against different 
individual incomes of respondents or employment status. Examining the relationship between 
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individual income and attitudes resulted in a p of 0.963, meaning that no statistically significant 
difference amongst the income categories was found (Table 5). This shows that lower income 
categories have no significant difference in immigration attitudes than those with higher income 
levels.  
 Additionally, no significant difference among the employment responses (p=0.963) was 
found between the variables showing that levels of employment don’t vary significantly from 
each other when it comes to attitudes towards immigration policies (Table 5). 





Square F p 
Between Income Levels 355.07 17 20.886 0.48 0.963 
Within Income Levels 51341.689 1179 43.547   
Between Employment Levels 465.806 6 77.634 1.803 0.095 
Within Employment Levels 51230.952 1190 43.051   
Total 51696.759 1196       
 
Support for Sanctuary Policy and Individual Economic Context 
 Using one-way ANOVA to analyze if responses to the question of supporting policies 
allowing cities to limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, better known as 
sanctuary policies, differed based on income level found no statistically significant (p=0.754) 
difference (Table 6). This determines that income levels did not vary significantly in support for 
sanctuary policies. 
 Similar results were found when analyzing the difference in sanctuary policy support 
among employment status categories. No statistically significant difference (p=0.4) between 




Table 6. Income and Support for Sanctuary Policies (n=1,211) 
Sanctuary Support Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Between Groups 26.985 17 1.587 0.75 0.754 
Within Groups 2534.012 1194 2.122   
Total 2560.997 1211       
 
Table 7. Employment Status and Support for Sanctuary Policies (n=1,211) 
Sanctuary Support Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Between Groups 13.139 6 2.19 1.04 0.4 
Within Groups 2547.858 1205 2.114   
Total 2560.997 1211       
 
Immigration Attitudes and Political Party 
 The ANOVA analysis exploring the difference in attitude scores amongst political 
ideologies produced a p value less than the significance level of 0.05 (p=0), determining that 
there is a statistically significant difference in means between Republican, Democrats and 
Independents (Table 8). Republicans scored on average 8.7631 points higher than Democrats and 
5.07326 than Independents, reflecting an average attitude that is more restrictive in comparison 
to their political counterparts. Table 9 (n=1,192) further describes the difference in attitudes by 
revealing the mean scores of each group with Democratic reporting the lowest score (12.5833), 
reflecting the most welcoming attitudes towards immigration policies; Independent with the 
second lowest (16.2732), reflecting a more moderate attitudes; and Republicans reporting the 
highest (21.3464), reflecting more restrictive attitudes. Table 9 also reflect the mean difference 
between groups and shows that Republicans on average scored 8.76310 points higher than 
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Democrats and 5.07326 points higher than Independents. Democrats scored on average 3.68984 
points lower than Independents. 
Table 8. Immigration Attitudes and Political Party (n=1,192) 
Attitudes Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F p 
Between Groups 13213.547 3 4404.516 136.23 0 
Within Groups 38441.938 1189 32.331   
Total 51655.485 1192     
 










A Republican A Democrat 8.76310* 0.43392 0 7.6468 9.8794 
 An independent 5.07326* 0.44082 0 3.9392 6.2074 
A Democrat A Republican -8.76310* 0.43392 0 -9.8794 -7.6468 
 An independent -3.68984* 0.38945 0 -4.6918 -2.6879 
An independent A Republican -5.07326* 0.44082 0 -6.2074 -3.9392 
  A Democrat 3.68984* 0.38945 0 2.6879 4.6918 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.    
Group N Mean 
Democrat 444 12.5833 
Republican 280 21.3464 





CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
Discussion 
I found significant differences in attitudes towards immigration policies across the 
political ideologies of Democratic, Republican and Independent ideologies, consistent with 
research finding that conservative ideologies often hold more restrictive views towards 
immigration policies and vice versa (Brooks et al., 2016; Fennelly & Federico, 2008; Natter et 
al., 2020). I found no significant relationship between state-level economic context and state 
average attitudes towards immigration policies, nor was any relationship found on an individual 
level. No significant differences in attitudes towards immigration policies were found among 
varying levels of individual income or employment status. These finding are contrary to research 
showing that when individuals are economically vulnerable, that economic context, not political 
ideology had more impact on attitudes towards immigration policies (Kim & Fording, 2001). 
 I found no significant correlation between state economic context and individual attitudes 
towards immigration policies (-0.032), nor between state economic context and state average 
attitudes towards immigration policies (-0.003). This in inconsistent from what I hypothesized 
based on the Ybarra (2016) study which found a significant relationship between state economic 
health and passing restrictive immigration legislation. I had hypothesized that the passing of 
immigration legislation would have similar results to attitudes towards immigration policies, but 
my research does not back up this claim. Further research into the how attitude formations 
inform legislation is needed in this area. 
 Research identified in the literature review by Kim and Fording (2001) as well as 
Esposito and Finley (2019) pointed toward perception of and rhetoric surrounding the economy 
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having a stronger relationship with attitudes towards immigration policies, than the individual 
economic context itself. My research corroborates this research in finding no significant 
relationship between individual income and immigration attitudes (p=0.963). Nor was any 
significant relationship found between employment status and immigration attitudes (p=0.095). 
The same was found when analyzing relationship between individual income and support for 
sanctuary policies (0.754) and employment status and support for sanctuary policies (0.4), 
producing no significant result. This is consistent with research showing that individual 
economic contexts have less impact on immigration attitudes than does the perception of 
nationwide economic contexts do (Kim & Fording, 2001; Esposito & Finley, 2019). Perhaps the 
issue is more nuanced due to interaction factors in the economy combining multiple factors of 
SECI, income and employment to understand the full story of attitude formation. Deeper studies 
into the combination effects of these variables could reveal a more significant relationship. 
Although economic context was not significant, I did find a significant difference (p=0) 
when comparing attitudes towards immigration policies across political ideologies. Republicans 
had the highest average score (21.3464), reflecting the most restrictive attitudes towards 
immigration policies among the three political ideologies analyzed. Democrats held the lowest 
score (12.5833), reflecting the most welcoming attitudes among the groups. These findings are 
consistent with previous research from Brooks, Manza and Cohen (2016), which found that 
conservative ideologies tend to show greater distrust and hostility to non-majority groups, while 
liberal ideologies are typically more tolerant to differences. Independents held moderate attitudes 






 While the findings from this research help the social work community to narrow down 
which social determinants effect attitudes towards immigration policies, results should be 
considered in the context of certain limitations. Firstly, the data, while nationally representative, 
was not representative at the state level. States with smaller population sizes including Alaska, 
Montana or District of Columbia had less than 10 respondents, creating a limitation in the overall 
data. Understanding this constraint, future researchers can structure their data collection to 
provide a more representative sample from each state.  
The sample from the 2018 AVS was weighted to closely reflected the demographic 
makeup of the U.S. at the time (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018), but my analysis of 
immigration attitudes may have been skewed by the 52% of respondents who were thrown out 
due to missing data. There may also exist a bias in who skips these questions and skewing the 
overall data. Not knowing why respondents skipped this question, be it that they had no opinion 
or wished not to share their opinion, could lead to underrepresentation of certain demographics. 
Because of this there could be a limitation in overall representation of U.S. demographic makeup 
and wouldn’t be widely applicable.   
 Another possible limitation stems from the overall breadth of the of the survey itself. The 
AVS is created each year to track the attitudes of American’s on a wide variety of social issues 
that the U.S. is facing (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). Because of this, only a small 
portion of the survey is in regard to immigration, which could dilute the responses due to the 
fatigue of taking the 110-question long survey. Creating a survey specifically tailored to 
immigration attitudes without the other social attitude question could help to get a more precise 
view into the desired variables. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS 
 In this study I found a significant difference in attitudes towards immigration policies 
across political party affiliations. Respondents who identified as Democrat, on average, held the 
most welcoming attitudes towards immigration policies. Respondents who identified as 
Republican, on average, held the more restrictive attitudes towards immigration policies. 
Economic context, including SECI, individual income, and employment, were found to have no 
significant relationship with individual or state-average attitudes towards immigration policies. 
Similarly, individual income and employment had no significant relationship with support for 
sanctuary policies. Understanding the relationship between these factors have, or don’t have, on 
attitudes towards immigration attitudes can help to inform social work practice, policy, and 
future research. 
Implications for Policy 
 Finding a significant relationship between political ideology, or political party affiliation, 
and attitudes towards immigration raises the issue of political divisiveness in relation to 
comprehensive immigration reform. It highlights the issue originally found by the 2018 AVS, 
that attitudes towards immigration policies are more divided than ever (Public Religion Research 
Institute, 2018). These findings highlight that political party identification and affiliation is 
difficult to change, especially when so tied to values and ideals (Carsey & Layman, 2006).   
 Recognizing which immigration policies have bipartisan support can help to bridge the 
political divide and choose those policies to focus on first in immigration reform. According to a 
survey conducted by Pew Research Center, around three-quarters of Americans, regardless of 
political party, supported a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers (2020). A policy that is currently 
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debated and could pass with this bipartisan support would be the American Dream and Promise 
act, which would grant permanent legal status to undocumented immigrants who came to the 
U.S. as children.  
 Another piece of legislation that could garner bipartisan support is the Farm Workforce 
Modernization Act, which would create a pathway to citizenship to undocumented farm workers, 
as well as reform the existing temporary agricultural work visa program. The reason this policy 
could find bipartisan support is due to the population it targets: agricultural workers. 
Undocumented farmworkers make up 70% of the agricultural workforce and contribute $9 
billion annually to the fruit and vegetable industry, not including other farm industries (Danilo, 
2020). Due to rural and agricultural voters often identifying as Republican (McDermott, 2009), 
in order to support their constituents, Republican legislators may support this policy. 
 Recognizing which policies can be achieved without bipartisan support is also important 
for policy advocates after understanding the political divide in attitudes towards immigration 
policies. Executive Orders can be enacted without bipartisan support, and there are policies that 
can potentially be reformed through this process. Increasing visa quotas is one change that can be 
advocated for that would have a wide impact on immigration. Allowing more visas each year 
would decrease the processing and wait times to receive those visas, which on average take 
between 5 and 6 years (Bier, 2019). 
 Using the knowledge that political party affiliation has the greatest impact on attitudes 
towards immigration policies in comparison to the other study factors, highlights the importance 
of using windows of opportunity in which Democrats control the House, Senate, and Presidency. 
These periods of opportunity should fully be taken advantage of and in these moments political 
instigators can focus energies on bringing immigration reform to the forefront of the agenda. 
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 On average, Independents scored only 3.68984 points higher than Democrats in attitudes 
towards immigration policies, showing that they hold more moderate attitudes in comparison to 
Republicans. This highlights them as potential allies in immigration reform endeavors. Coupling 
the forces of Democratic and Independent powers could help to bring more support for 
welcoming immigration policies. 
Implications for Practice 
The relationship between attitudes towards immigration policies and political party 
affiliation may create a difficult situation for social workers hoping to impact immigration 
reform through practice. Political party affiliation, and specifically the beliefs and values ties to 
is, is difficult to influence due to its inherent ties to those personal beliefs and values (Carsey & 
Layman, 2006). Direct practice social workers must work to influence those beliefs and values if 
we are to see change through education about benefits of immigration as well as combatting 
misinformation surrounding immigration discussions and policies could help to challenge those 
beliefs and values that are tied to political party affiliation. Additionally, education and 
transparency concerning immigration policies in order to help Americans better understand how 
those policies will benefit them could sway their attitudes towards immigration policies. 
Education is an important factor of influence because it seeks not to criticize already held beliefs, 
but to add to them and clarify. 
Implications for Future Research 
Finding the relationship between political party affiliation and attitudes towards 
immigration policies, not economic context and attitudes towards immigration policies, was 
more significant, pushes future research to focus on finding those policies that have bipartisan 
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support, as well as researching why that is so. Additionally, further research into what has the 
most impact on political party affiliation, and which factors have the potential to change that 
affiliation.  
Though my study found no significant relationship between economic context and 
individual immigration attitudes, future research into how economic factors like individual 
income, employment status, and economic context interact to influence individual attitudes 
towards immigration policies could be beneficial to better explore the influence of economic 
context. Another path for future research could be to fill in the gaps in Ybarra’s research (2016), 
to better understand the process between attitude formation and immigration policy legislation. 
Additionally, better understanding the interrelationship between economic context and political 
ideology (Kim & Fording, 2001) on immigration attitudes would be beneficial as well. Finally, 
research into how political ideology and economic context interact to influence individual 
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